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APPLYING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO ONGOING INTIMATE 
VIOLENCE: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 
C. QUINCE HOPKINS,* MARY P. KOSS,** AND KAREN J. BACHAR*** 
I.  IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: 
THE LIMITS OF EXISTING REMEDIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
The prevalence of domestic violence is certainly well documented.1  While 
Western historical accounts of domestic violence intervention efforts focus 
primarily on events of the last few decades, women and men have in fact been 
working to eradicate intimate abuse for over 2000 years.2  The first known tort-
like remedy for domestic violence was enacted over two millennia ago, in 200 
B.C.E.3  The first criminal prohibition against all domestic battering (other 
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appreciation go out to the editorial board of the St. Louis University Public Law Review, 
particularly John M. Challis, for their exceptional work preparing this article for publication.  The 
RESTORE program is funded by a 1.5 million dollar grant from the National Center for Injury 
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 1. See infra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 2. For a full discussion of this subject, see C. Quince Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships: 
Towards a Nuanced Theory of Domestic Violence as Sex Discrimination, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 411, 419-20 (2002) (describing historical reform efforts over the past two millennia).  For a 
discussion of reform efforts of battered women’s advocates in the United States during the last 
three decades of the 20th century, see LORETTA FREDRICK & KRISTINE C. LIZDAS, BATTERED 
WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT, THE ROLE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE BATTERED WOMEN’S 
MOVEMENT 6, 11, 15 (Sept. 2003) (describing the battered women’s movement as focused 
primarily on criminal justice reform along with the following issues: community education, 
shelters and support groups, advocacy for protection orders, and to a lesser degree, victim 
compensation, and restitution). 
 3. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 420. 
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than in self-defense) was established in the Puritan’s Bodies of Liberties of 
1641.4  But it is not until the latter part of the 20th century that one can observe 
a concerted global effort to address the wide-spread prevalence of domestic 
violence that was perhaps not present in these prior reform movements.5  
However, although these more recent efforts may seem substantial, there is 
only minimal evidence that these reforms have yielded low prevalence rates of 
family violence in any significant way, at least in the United States.6  In 1993, 
for example, almost forty percent of all reported violent assaults against 
women in the United States resulted from family violence: intimate partners 
perpetrated approximately twenty-nine percent of reported violent assaults 
against women, and other relatives perpetrated an additional nine percent of 
violent assaults against women.7 
Further, existing legal responses to family violence provide incomplete 
redress for survivors.  For instance, as witnesses rather than parties in criminal 
cases, victims’ control over prosecution is limited; in fact the traditional 
criminal justice system, at the urging of battered women’s advocates, 
affirmatively displaces battered women from the center of prosecutions in a 
noble effort to take on the primary responsibility of confronting batterers about 
their violence.8  Second, when prosecutions do take place, and domestic 
violence defendants are actually convicted, the penalty “paid” by the defendant 
rarely devolves to the victim’s benefit outside of criminal “stay-away” orders.9  
The only other direct benefit to victims, when it is ordered, is restitution; this is 
a remedy rarely sought by victims, particularly when family resources are 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 422. 
 6. Id. at 423. 
 7. See DIANE CRAVEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SELECTED FINDINGS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF 
VIOLENT CRIME 2 (1996) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvvc.pdf.  An 
additional 40% of assaults on women appear to have been committed by an 
“acquaintance/friend.”  Id.  This category might include perpetrators that were not clearly 
identified as an intimate partner, but who would in fact fit into that category.  Thus the figure for 
incidents of domestic violence against women might well be much closer to 78% of assaults 
against women.  Id.  Statistics for the same period indicate that in contrast to female assaults, 
male victimizations more frequently involved strangers.  Id.  Male victims are about as likely to 
be victimized by a stranger, at 49%, as by someone they know (51%).  Id.  More recent statistics 
indicate that 20% of non-fatal violence against women is committed by their intimate partners 
(including spouses, former spouses, boyfriends, and girlfriends).  CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, at 2001, at 1 (Feb. 2003) available 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.  Concerning the controversy over prevalence 
measures, see Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 423. 
 8. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 28; Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra 
note 2, at 435. 
 9. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2 at 436. 
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limited.10  In addition, empirical research demonstrates that what most victims 
really want, beyond stopping the violence itself, is not punishment in the form 
of jail time or a fine, but an opportunity to speak about what has happened to 
them and to receive an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and/or an apology 
from the defendant.11  Third, existing remedies are problematic because they 
often base relief on an essentialized conception of a victim of domestic 
violence which can exclude many survivors from protection.12  One can 
attempt to describe the prototypical domestic violence case, and these efforts 
are laudable and not without value, but any such attempt is necessarily ham-
fisted when applied to real victims and real perpetrators; each victim presents 
her own particular concerns and circumstances.13  Existing remedies such as 
civil rights remedies and battered woman syndrome defenses often fail to 
adequately accommodate these differences.14 
 
 10. Id.; FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that victim compensation is rarely 
sought by victims since family resources often barely meet existing needs). 
 11. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 436; see also FREDERICK & 
LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 33-34 (noting that most women do not want the men who batter them to 
be penalized and critiquing some battered women’s programs for insisting on an approach that 
emphasizes separation from the abuser, thus merely replacing one view of what she should do – 
that of the batterer, with another – that of the program); accord Donna Coker, Enhancing 
Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 67 - 73 
(discussing Navajo Peacemaking as a justice approach that avoids the problem of forcing women 
to choose between competing loyalties and identities).  See also Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame, 
and Community: Justice Responses to Violence Against Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332 
(2000).  This is discussed more at length in C. Quince Hopkins, Remembering and Forgetting: 
The Role of Public Truth-Telling in Law, at 9 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 12. On the variation among domestic violence victims, see MICHELE HARWAY, BATTERED 
WOMEN: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES; BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVE, 29-31, 35-36 (M. Hansen & M. Harway eds., 1993) reprinted in CLARE DALTON 
& ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 96–97 (2001). 
 13. See Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 424 (discussing variation 
among victims).  Concerning variation among perpetrators, see, e.g., DONALD DUTTON, THE 
BATTERER 12-14, 22-38 (1995) (describing different kinds of batterers); HARWAY, supra note 12, 
at 95–97 (describing victims of intimate violence); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered 
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1991) (“‘Battered woman’ 
is not a simple term”); Elizabeth Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist 
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 529-31 (1992) (objecting 
to the essentializing nature of the term “battered woman”). 
 14. Evidentiary rules that allow introduction of expert testimony on Battered Woman 
Syndrome have proven particularly problematic in criminal defense cases involving battered 
women who fight back: a woman who strikes back or demonstrates some financial independence 
may not appear to fit the model helpless victim that Lenore Walker, who first developed the 
theory of battered woman syndrome, portrayed.  See, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, 
at 743 (2001) (pointing out that battered woman syndrome contains the risk of creating a new 
stereotype of a “real” battered woman as “dependant, passive, psychologically as well as 
physically damaged by the abuse, and helpless . . . [which] in turn creates the risk that women 
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Fourth, most legal remedies fail to account for the ongoing nature of both 
the violence and, in some cases, the relationship itself.  The failure to address 
the ongoing nature of domestic violence is largely evident in procedural and 
evidentiary rules.  When physical acts of violence do occur, evidentiary rules, 
which exclude prior bad acts, imply that each attack should be viewed as a 
flare up, a loss of control, a discrete act of violence that can be treated in the 
same regard as any other single criminal act.15  Legislatures have begun to 
develop statutes aimed at behaviors that are part of an ongoing pattern, 
typically in the form of harassment and stalking statutes,16 but these efforts 
have not gone far enough because they normally become relevant only after 
the relationship has ended.  Moreover, these statutes do not address the regime 
of “private tyranny” under which a victim has lived prior to separating from 
her abuser, nor are they typically sensitive to the possible ongoing relationship 
between the parties.17  This is not to say that we should dismantle feminist 
reform efforts of the past few decades that have moved towards insuring that 
criminal acts of violence against intimate partners are not brushed under the 
rug as mere private squabbles.  However, to the extent victims need legal 
remedies to account for this reality of their lives, we should do our best to 
insure that responses to intimate violence do so. 
Fifth and finally, existing civil and criminal remedies tend to account for 
physical and economic harm to victims, but almost entirely fail to account for 
psychological harm from intimate violence despite the fact that the emotional 
damage from intimate violence typically lasts long after physical injuries have 
healed.  In fact, victims report that the psychological abuse causes them the 
 
who do not conform to the helpless stereotype may be unable to benefit from expert testimony 
about battering”); see generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).  Recent civil 
rights remedies for domestic violence similarly rely upon this trope of the “real” or paradigmatic 
battered woman, while simultaneously creating a large sub-set of battered women who fall 
outside their boundaries, and therefore now look less victimized in contrast.  See Hopkins, 
Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 418. 
 15. In practice, the situation for victims is actually often much worse than if they had been 
the victim of a stranger assault.  In cases of stranger assault, police often take into account past 
documented assaults by a suspect in deciding whether to arrest the suspect.  See FED. R. EVID. 
404(a)(1). Generally, character evidence cannot be used to show action in conformity with the 
stated characteristic.  Id. 
 16. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (1999 and Supp. 2003) (stalking and harassment); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.3 (2000 and Supp. 2003) (stalking). 
 17. I borrow the term “private tyranny” from Jane Maslow Cohen.  See Jane Maslow Cohen, 
Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law? 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 757, 762-67 (1996).  For a cogent discussion of the importance of taking account of 
the ongoing nature of the relationship and the potential for future violence, see FREDERICK & 
LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 29, 34. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] APPLYING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO ONGOING INTIMATE VIOLENCE 293 
 
most harm.18  The number of women who suffer from clinical depression as a 
result of physical abuse is extremely high.19  Furthermore, studies have shown 
that almost thirty percent of suicide attempts among females involve battered 
women.20  Despite this fact, physical acts that violate bodily integrity alone 
form the basis of typical criminal felony and misdemeanor charges.21  When a 
punch or sexual assault also causes psychological damage, some tort actions 
may incorporate a remedy for it, but this is of limited availability.22  Just as 
legislatures should consider the ongoing, cumulative nature of abusive 
conduct, non-physical or psychological harm should also shape the process of 
defining legal remedies. 
 
 18. See generally DUTTON, supra note 13; Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation 
for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 433 (1998). 
 19. See Mary P. Koss et al., Depression and PTSD in Survivors of Male Violence: Research 
and Training Initiatives to Facilitate Recovery, 27 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 130, 134-135 (2003) 
(reviewing rates of depression).  See also discussion infra Section II(C). 
 20. See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Killing the Beast Within: Woman Battering and 
Female Suicidality, 25 INT’L  J. HEALTH SERV. 43, 50 (1995). 
 21. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (classifying assault and 
battery against a family or household member as a Class One misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-67.2:1 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (classifying marital rape in Virginia as punishable by not less 
than five years in a state correctional facility, although further providing for probation in lieu of 
incarceration where the defendant obtains counseling).  For general descriptions of battering 
behavior, see generally WALKER, supra note 14. 
 22. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 124 n.7 
(2001) (citing Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 183, 189 n.16 (1995)).  As William Prosser opines in his classic tome on the law of torts: 
It does not lie within the power of any judicial system to remedy all human wrongs . . . .  
Trivialities must be left to other means of settlement, and many wrongs which in 
themselves are flagrant – ingratitude, avarice, broken faith, brutal words, and heartless 
disregard of the feelings of others – are beyond any effective legal remedy, and any 
practical administration of the law. 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984); but cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (“one who by extreme . . . conduct intentionally 
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”).  See generally 
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); SUSAN ESTRICH, 
REAL RAPE (1987).  See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton et al., Court-Involved Battered Women’s 
Responses to Violence: The Role of Psychological, Physical, and Sexual Abuse, at 3 (1999) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); C. Quince Hopkins, Domestic Violence as Torture: 
Possibilities and Limits of the Law in Combating the Psychological Harm and Patterned Nature 
of Domestic Violence (1998-99) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Stanford Law School) (on file with 
author).  Stalking is a now-classic example of “non-violent” and yet threatening behavior.  See, 
e.g., Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 49, 63-64 (1997) (describing the effect of non-actionable stalking behavior). 
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In order to reduce permanently the prevalence of this problem and to 
provide survivors with comprehensive remedies, advocates must continue to 
press for novel legal reforms in the hope that the right combination of legal 
interventions will someday be achieved that will finally reduce the prevalence 
of this public health problem and at the same time meet the needs of individual 
victims.  One such possibility is applying restorative justice to family violence.  
The possibilities and limits of such an approach are the focus of the remainder 
of this article.23  Section II explains the concepts underlying and models 
implementing restorative justice.  Sections III and IV assess feminist theories 
and particular critiques of the application of restorative justice to intimate 
violence, identifying them as primarily empirical ones.  Finally, Section V 
discusses empirical evidence of successes in using restorative justice in 
violence against women cases. 
II.  WHAT IS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE? 
Restorative justice is a philosophy that places emphasis on repairing harm, 
empowering a victim-driven process, and transforming the community’s role 
in addressing crime.  It approaches offender accountability through making 
reparations and undergoing rehabilitation rather than by punishment.24  Recent 
literature reveals numerous thoughtful considerations of the application of 
restorative justice to crimes against women.25  Restorative justice models 
 
 23. Other scholars, many of whom are cited in this article, have addressed the potential 
theoretical benefits and detriments of restorative justice for family violence cases.  Some authors 
advocate against using restorative justice in this venue, while others advocate for such an 
approach.  One scholar who takes the latter position is Linda Mills.  See LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT 
TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 134-142 (2003).  Mills’s work 
might well reach the right result, but not necessarily for the right reasons.  Her call for restorative 
justice for intimate violence rests in part on claims of women’s culpability in the violence they 
experience and women’s equal use of physical violence against their partners.  The research on 
which she rests her argument has been discredited on a number of bases, which unfortunately 
undercuts the strength of her contribution to this field.  See Walter DeKeseredy, Book Review, 
Insult to Injury: Rethinking our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). 
 24. For a more complete discussion of restorative justice, see Mary P. Koss, Karen J. 
Bachar, & C. Quince Hopkins, An Innovative Application of Restorative Justice to the 
Adjudication of Selected Sexual Offenses, in CRIME PREVENTION, NEW APPROACHES 321 
(Helmut Kury & Joachim Obergfell-Fuchs eds. 2003). 
 25. See generally Gordon Bazemore & Twila Hugley Earle, Balance in the Response to 
Family Violence: Challenging Restorative Principles, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 153 (John Braithwaite & Heather Strang eds., 2002); John Braithwaite & Kathleen 
Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN 151 
(Susan L. Miller ed., 1998); Kathleen Daly, Sexual Assault and Restorative Justice, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra, at 62; Laureen Snider, Feminism, 
Punishment, and the Potential of Empowerment, in CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 246 
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include (a) civil proceedings, (b) victim-offender reparation through mediation, 
and (c) community conference approaches.26 
Civil justice for intimate violence is pursued only with responsible parties 
with substantial financial assets, which limits its applicability as a prevention 
tool.27  Furthermore, civil justice is an adversarial process that shares the 
traumatizing features of retributive justice.  It also often involves comparative 
fault doctrine, a new way to promote victim blame that is not part of criminal 
trials.28  On a more theoretical level, a tort action expresses a fundamentally 
different notion than does a criminal action. That is, a tort claim is entirely 
private, personal, and individual in nature and aims to adjust rights as between 
private persons rather than vindicate larger public or community interests.29 
With respect to the second major form of restorative justice, mediation’s 
conceptual foundation is inappropriate for application to crimes against 
women because it fails to acknowledge the structural inequalities between the 
victim and offender and wrongly presumes that there is “voice parity” between 
the parties such that they have the same “truth-telling capacity.”30  That is, 
most feminists subscribe to the theory that a batterer uses violence as a tool to 
maintain power and control over his victim and that the physical violence can 
be understood as a method of maintaining and reinforcing patriarchal gender 
roles in particular.31  Mediation theory, however, rests on the assumption of 
 
(Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998); Michael Cavadino & James Dignan, Reparation, 
Retribution and Rights, 4 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 233 (1996); Coker, supra note 11; Barbara 
Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 237 
(1998); Koss, supra note 11; Einat Peled et al., Choice and Empowerment for Battered Women 
Who Stay: Towards a Constructivist Model, 45 SOC. WORK 9 (2000). 
 26. See Koss et al., supra note 24, at 325. 
 27. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 437. 
 28. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (1999). 
 29. I do not mean to overstate or misstate the matter here; tort law does embody some public 
values such as financial cost-sharing concepts. 
 30. See, e.g., FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 26, 29, 38 (using the terms “voice 
parity” and “truth-telling capacity”).  Frederick and Lizdas also argue that restorative justice that 
encompasses face-to-face meetings between victim and offender might encourage confusion over 
responsibility for the violence and inadvertently suggest that the victim is somehow responsible 
for the violence.  Id. at 29.  This result is evidenced in Linda Mills’s call for restorative justice 
because it in part incorporates the idea that women are partly to blame for the violence.  See 
Mills, supra note 23.  For a procedural critique of mediation, see Jennifer Brown, The Use of 
Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1273-79 
(1994); Evelyn Zellerer, Community-Based Justice and Violence Against Women: Issues of 
Gender and Race, 20 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 233, 236 (1996). 
 31. See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE’LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT 94 
(1994) (describing that women are beaten when they attempt to resist control or when they refuse 
to comply with a batterer’s demands or expectations); accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 
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equal or near-equal bargaining power between the parties.32  The underlying 
power dynamic in domestic violence cases thus makes it inappropriate for 
mediation. 
By contrast, many experts believe community conferencing comes the 
closest to achieving restorative justice ideals, addressing the power disparities 
often present in crimes of violence against women, and avoiding the trauma 
and other problems of traditional civil justice.33  Community conferencing is a 
coming together of identified family and other supporters for the victim and 
offender in a professionally facilitated meeting to address the wrong done and 
the harm that resulted from that wrong – to all parties and their relationships 
with others – and to identify what the offender is going to do to make right the 
wrong.34  Proper and complete preparation is key to a successful outcome of 
community conferencing, and this is even truer in the case of conferencing 
applied to violence against women, where underlying belief systems need to be 
challenged. 
In the following Section, we outline key feminist concepts relevant to a 
restorative justice response to violence against women.  In Section IV, we will 
then address the central concerns expressed by feminists about such an 
approach. 
III.  FEMINIST THEORY AND CONCERNS ABOUT APPLYING RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
 
2, at 11, 26, 27; see also Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 991-92 (1995) (discussing child and marital 
abuse throughout history, and the patriarchal structure that accompanies it).  But cf. Deborah M. 
Hanrahan, Gender and Spousal Violence: A Test of Social Control and Resource Theories, at 90-
96 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University) (on file with author) 
(arguing that power/dominance theory alone does not explain domestic violence, but rather, the 
combination of power/dominance and social control theory provide a better and more complete 
account of intimate abuse).  As to the ostensible willing acquiescence to this patriarchal structure, 
some feminist scholars question whether this kind of a choice reflects a true exercise of free will.  
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 329-30 (1995) (stating that feminist women often question whether their 
own willing assimilation to the patriarchal structure makes their own oppression more or less 
likely). 
 32. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1498, 1602-03 (1993); accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 25, 26, 29. 
 33. Cavadino & Dignan, supra note 25, at 253. 
 34. Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic Justice, 67 
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 97, 98 (1998).  For a critique of the role of community in restorative justice for 
domestic violence, see FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 25, 27, 29, 32 (noting that the 
relevant community in fact may not understand the dynamics of domestic violence, and might 
even engage in victim-blaming behavior and collusion with the offender). 
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Feminist theory comprises different, but overlapping, philosophical and 
political stances.  Although there are several ways one might separate these 
strands, scholars often divide them into three categories: liberal, cultural, and 
radical feminism.35  Liberal feminists, also referred to as “sameness” or “rule 
equality” feminists, argue that formal equal treatment of men and women will 
result in formal and functional equality between the sexes.36  “‘Sameness 
feminists’ focus on the similarities between individual men and individual 
women [leads] them to advocate ‘gender-neutral’ categories that do not rely on 
gender stereotypes to differentiate between men and women.”37  In the eyes of 
liberal feminists, the goals of law reform are laws and practices that respond to 
violence against women in the home in the same way that those laws and 
practices respond to stranger violence against men. 
Cultural feminists, also referred to as “substantive equality” or 
“difference” feminists, disagree that alteration of formal rules will result in 
actual equality for women; equal treatment, they argue, disadvantages women 
because the baselines favor men.38  Cultural feminists claim that traditional 
religious, economic, political, and judicial institutions are both masculinist by 
nature and masculinist in practice.39  For instance, these institutions are 
masculinist in nature in that they are structured hierarchically rather than on a 
collaborative model.40  For some feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon, 
who is often referred to as a “dominance” feminist, these structural 
frameworks undergird as well as create men’s dominance over women.41  For 
cultural feminists relying on Carol Gilligan’s work on women’s ethic of care, 
collaboration and interpersonal relationships are particularly valued by women; 
 
 35. Barbara Ann White, Feminist Foundations for the Law of Business: One Law and 
Economics Scholar’s Survey and (Re)View, 10 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 44 (1999); cf. Patricia 
Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367 (1997). 
 36. Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32 
(2001). 
 37. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1985); but see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 837 
(1989). 
 38. Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work 
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 27 (1998); Martha L. Fineman, 
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and 
Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 811-12 (1983). 
 39. White, supra note 35, at 45. 
 40. Id. at 46. 
 41. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161-64 
(1989) (claiming that her dominance theory is feminism, as opposed to one form or strand of 
feminist theory); Ertman, supra note 38, at 93 n.314. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
298 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:289 
 
whereas hierarchy is particularly embraced by men.42  Most (but not all) 
cultural feminists today, however, claim not that women are in fact different 
from men but that certain traits and values are perceived as “feminine” or 
“female” or as “masculine” or “male” and that “male/masculine” traits are 
embraced by legal and other institutions, while “female/feminine” traits are 
devalued, marginalized, or even excluded by those institutions.43  In this sense, 
for cultural feminists these institutions are masculinist in practice to the extent 
that the rules under which they function exclude women’s unique voice and 
lived experience; Robin West argues, for instance, that ostensibly neutral legal 
evidentiary rules do not accommodate women’s particular narrative method, 
thus yielding a crabbed account of any given woman’s experience.44  From a 
cultural feminist perspective, then, recognition of women’s experiences and 
contributions promotes equality.45 
To the extent that women’s experiences of intimate violence are thus only 
partially considered by a theoretically objectively neutral legal system, this 
formal system often fails in providing any redress, much less a feminist 
response.46  The failure of the system, in turn, may bolster the notion that 
physical intimate violence against women is not a serious crime.  A victim-
centered restorative justice response that not only incorporates a survivor’s full 
experience, but also holds an offender accountable to her and their relevant 
community may yield the opposite outcome.  In addition, insofar as cultural 
feminism insists on the importance of human interconnectedness and 
relationships, a justice system response would be feminist if it emphasizes the 
damage that sexual or physical violence causes to relationships rather than only 
recognizing the wrong done to the abstract state.  Restorative justice takes 
exactly this approach. 
Contemporary radical feminist scholars, also referred to as “postmodern” 
feminists, seek to eradicate inequality by undermining the existing binary 
construct of male and female that have the effect of subordinating women to 
men.47  Postmodern feminists thus advocate a complete restructuring of what 
society understands as available gender roles.48  To the extent that intimate 
violence towards women arises out of and relies upon polarized gendered roles 
of maleness and femaleness, breaking down those constructs – the argument 
 
 42. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 163-64 (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence 
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 50 (1988). 
 43. West, supra note 42, at 13. 
 44. Id. at 18. 
 45. Ertman, supra note 38, at 27; West, supra note 42, at 2-3. 
 46. Cain, supra note 35, at 367. 
 47. See generally Eichner, supra note 36. 
 48. Ertman, supra note 38, at 27. 
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goes – may result in reductions of men’s physical assaults on women.49  In a 
more general sense, however, restorative justice maps onto the postmodern 
drive to break down categories.  That is, by providing for a particularized 
response to a crime of intimate violence, restorative justice insists that 
survivors and responsible parties be viewed as something other than 
predetermined caricatures of victim and offender. 
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, feminism embraces multiple 
perspectives and theories, such that the appropriate term is not the singular but 
the plural: “feminisms.”50  Despite these various strands, a few precepts tend to 
thread through them.  First, each theory – with the exception of a narrow strand 
of “difference feminism” that holds fast to pure biological determinism – 
incorporates the understanding that gender is socially, historically, and 
culturally constructed.51  Thus, gendered harm such as physical or sexual 
violence against women is similarly socially, historically, and culturally 
constructed.  Second, social life and institutions are inextricable from gender 
and gender relations.52  That is, not only do gendered social systems support 
rape and domestic violence, so also do legal institutions’ failure to implement 
effective remedies create and support that belief system.53  Third, social and 
institutional structures are grounded on notions of men’s superiority over 
women; in this vein, violence against women often (although not always) 
represents the perpetrator’s belief about male dominance and female 
subordination.54 
Fourth, descriptions of and responses to social and legal constructs, 
institutions, and practices must be grounded in women’s lived experiences.55  
Thus, a feminist response to intimate violence against women must take 
account of, and where possible, map onto survivors’ expressed preferences for 
 
 49. Eichner, supra note 36, at 76. 
 50. See Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 JUST. Q. 497, 
501-02 (1988); Susan Ayers, Incest in a Thousand Acres: Cheap Trick or Feminist Re-vision, 11 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131, 134-35 (2001). 
 51. Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 50, at 501. 
 52. Id. at 504. 
 53. Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 25, at 166-67; cf. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 
34 (noting that the criminal justice system’s message that violence is intolerable is not overt in 
most domestic violence cases, and even less so with respect to non-criminal but otherwise 
controlling or intimidating behavior on the part of the batterer). 
 54. Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 50, at 499-500; Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 25, at 
172-73; accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
 55. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical 
Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1630 (1991); Julie Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women’s 
Safety, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 47-48. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
300 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:289 
 
redress.56  Further, however, most feminist theorists understand that women’s 
lived experiences are not monolithic and universal, but culturally diverse, 
highly contextual, and socially constructed.57  This insight triggers two 
additional considerations.  First, a feminist response to the experience of 
intimate violence accommodates this variety by providing multiple options for 
survivors, rather than one single cookie-cutter response.  Second, however, this 
“positionality” – that is, that any individual woman’s experience is always and 
already contingent and constructed – suggests that although experience 
remains an important and a “useful . . . basis for knowledge, [it must be] 
coupled with the insight that the knowledge thus obtained is limited by 
context.”58  For purposes of constructing a feminist response to intimate 
violence against women, this means that an individual victim’s preference may 
diverge from what, in the abstract, might be thought of as a “true” feminist 
response, one which accounts for the larger systemic and institutional history 
and practice of male physical dominance over women.59  Whether a response 
to intimate violence might nonetheless be able to address both the individual 
preferences of women and the larger systemic issues is no small matter, but 
this is an unavoidable tension once we insist that women’s voices and 
preferences matter. 
IV.  PARTICULAR FEMINIST CONCERNS ABOUT RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
Although restorative justice is now used widely and with some success 
with juveniles, including juvenile sex offenders,60 experience with restorative 
 
 56. Cain, supra note 35, at 367; accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 30, 33; but 
cf. id. at 33 (arguing that battered women’s autonomy and choice to enter a restorative justice 
program are not straightforward since fear of reprisal should she not participate may drive her to 
“choose” to participate). 
 57. Nan Seuffert, Lawyering and Domestic Violence: Feminist Integration of Experiences, 
Theories and Practice, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 80 (Julie Stubbs ed., 1994). 
 58. Id. at 81. 
 59. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 60.  For a discussion of the need to address the larger systemic 
issues of gender, race, and cultural oppression at work in domestic violence, see FREDERICK & 
LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 23-24, 34, 37-38.  In some contexts, a victim’s expressed preference 
may not only be mediated and formed through cultural influence, but also may be compromised 
or constrained by immediate circumstances.  Stubbs, supra note 55, at 44.  For instance, a victim 
of domestic violence may feel her choices are limited because of the potential future violence 
from her abuser; in addition, if she has children with her abuser, her connection to those children 
may further limit her full atomistic agency.  Id.  Accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 
33. 
 60. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 6; see generally Mary Koss, Karen Bachar, & C. 
Quince Hopkins, Disposition and Treatment of Juvenile Sex Offenders from the Perspective of 
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justice in response to violence against adult women is limited.61  As when 
moving into any new area of research where lives may be at stake, it is 
important to maintain a balance between the hope of success and prudence in 
applying restorative justice to new areas.  One must at all times be mindful of 
the potential risk of harm to participants.62  Some feminist scholars have raised 
important questions about the wisdom of using of restorative justice in 
response to gendered violence.  The majority of these concerns center on 
whether restorative justice is an effective and safe response to violence against 
women.63  Whether it is in fact safe or effective is, of course, an empirical 
question.64  In her careful study of Navajo Peacemaker courts’ handling of 
domestic violence cases, Donna Coker identifies the coerced attendance of 
battered women coupled with the lack of safety screening as problematic 
aspects of that program.  After arguing that a peacemaking program could be 
modified to correct these problems, Coker then rightly notes that with such a 
modified program we may still ultimately find that the potential benefits of 
restorative justice exist only in theory, but not in practice.65  The same is true 
for the potential detriments of restorative justice for intimate violence: whether 
the detriments will be borne out in practice must be evaluated empirically, 
 
Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK ON THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDERS 
(Howard Barbaree ed. (publication forthcoming 2004)); Koss et al., supra note 24, at 322-29. 
 61. Compare the work of Donna Coker discussing Navajo Peacemaking for cases of family 
violence in Coker, supra note 11, at 1.  Coker’s evaluation of the Navajo Peacemaker courts does 
not address whether or not these programs are effective in reducing battering.  She thus urges 
caution in moving forward until that empirical evidence has been established. 
 62. See John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice and Family Violence, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 1; cf. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, 
supra note 2, at 40 (arguing that restorative justice for domestic violence cases should, at a 
minimum, “do no harm” to victims). 
 63. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 25, at 242; Stubbs, supra note 55, at 56-58; Coker, supra 
note 11, at 114-15 (categorizing feminist concerns about informal adjudication for battered 
women into four types: “the coercion problem, the cheap-justice problem, the normative problem, 
and the communitarian/social-change problem”); see generally FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 
2. 
 64. Braithwate & Strang, supra note 62, at 1-2; cf. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 32 
(inaccurately noting that because of flaws in restorative justice practice, the utility of restorative 
justice has not yet been tested).  Others who have studied restorative justice in indigenous 
contexts similarly question whether restorative justice will work in all cultural contexts.  See 
Coker, supra note 11, at 107-111.  Further, whether restorative justice will undercut or bolster 
class, race, gender, and other oppressions also must be carefully watched.  Stubbs, supra note 55, 
at 48, 56. 
 65. Coker, supra note 11, at 77-80, 103-07, 111 (discussing the problem of coerced 
participation and absence of safety screening, advocating for corrections of these problems, and 
pointing out that the benefits may not be realized in practice).  Peacemaking and sentencing 
circles are two justice interventions employed by First Nations in the United States and Canada.  
These approaches are versions of restorative justice.  Id. at 3-4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
302 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:289 
 
something Coker does not purport to undertake.  Cognizant of Coker’s caution, 
however, in undertaking such a project, it is critical that restorative justice’s 
foray into the new territory of violence against women takes these concerns 
seriously.  Such a foray must be guided by these caveats in choosing those 
types of cases that pose the lowest potential risks to participants and the format 
for responding to them. 
In developing our own research on restorative justice for sex offenses 
between acquaintances, funded by a $1.5 million dollar grant from the Centers 
for Disease Control, we placed these concerns front and center.  In developing 
our pilot research demonstration project, entitled RESTORE, we specifically 
chose to focus on a very narrow class of cases which posed the least risk of 
harm to participants and the highest possible success rate.  We have explained 
the structure of this program and its theoretical grounding at length 
elsewhere.66  In brief, we specifically chose to address sexual assaults between 
acquaintances, rather than cases of physical violence between intimates.  We 
chose to do so precisely because many of the concerns about restorative justice 
for violence against women, discussed at length below, are less applicable to 
acquaintance sexual assault.  We discuss these distinctions at length in another 
article but note here just one illustrative distinction.67  Two of the feminist 
concerns, discussed below, are that restorative justice will give an offender an 
opportunity to engage in further violence and to psychologically abuse and 
manipulate the survivor.  In the narrow class of cases eligible for RESTORE – 
most notably, only cases where the offense was not part of an ongoing pattern 
of ongoing domestic violence – there is a reduced likelihood of deep 
emotional, economic, and psychological enmeshment between the parties.  
Where the parties’ interaction with each other is thus less intertwined, the 
opportunity for the offender to engage in further physical violence or 
psychological control of the survivor is significantly reduced.68  It was our 
conclusion, therefore, that in moving forward with an as yet untested 
application of restorative justice – that is, its application to gendered violence 
generally — sexual assault between acquaintances was a “safer” test venue 
than was ongoing physical violence between intimates.69 
 
 66. See Koss, supra note 11; Koss et al., supra note 24; Mary P. Koss, Karen J. Bachar & C. 
Quince Hopkins, Restorative Justive for Sexual Violence: Repairing Victims, Building 
Community, and Holding Offenders Accountable, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 384 (2003). 
 67. See C. Quince Hopkins, Mary P. Koss & Karen J. Bachar, Incorporating Feminist 
Theory Into a Restorative Justice Response to Sex Offenses, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  For a careful presentation of the argument that restorative justice will not necessarily 
account for the possibility of future violence in cases of domestic violence and urging that 
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Joan Pennel and Gale Burford’s work, discussed in Section V, by contrast, 
applies restorative justice to cases of family violence.  Similarly, however, 
their approach also takes seriously the feminist concerns about using 
restorative justice for violence against women and proceeds cautiously in 
implementing such a program for domestic violence.  Pennel and Burford’s 
research is yielding preliminary evidence of being more effective than 
traditional justice for intimate violence. 
The specific feminist concerns raised about restorative justice in 
connection with family violence are the following.  First, and primarily, if one 
chooses to address cases of intimate violence where the violence has occurred 
on more than one occasion already, the face-to-face concept of community 
conferencing simply creates an opportunity for further acts of violence against 
the victim.70  Second, even if the violence has occurred just one time, the face-
to-face approach may either intentionally or unintentionally pressure the victim 
into returning to a potentially dangerous relationship.71  Third, the 
psychological impact on victims from ongoing domestic violence may 
negatively affect her ability to present and protect her interests and wishes 
during the course of the community conference.72  Fourth, the power and 
control dynamics in many domestic violence cases mean that the process of 
conferencing will yield poor results for victims unable to hold their own in the 
face-to-face meeting.73  In addition, not only might fear constrain a victim’s 
full agency, her connection to her children may compromise her otherwise 
more free choice, as might economic and other enmeshment between the 
victim and perpetrator.74  Fifth, to the extent that restorative justice relies on a 
component of therapeutic intervention with perpetrators, there is only moderate 
evidence that batterer’s treatment is at all effective: this evidence can be found 
in very high quality programs and only where an offender actually completes 
the program – a mere 10% of all program participants.  Assessment of these 
programs reveals that treated and non-treated abusers were not significantly 
different in their future rates of re-offending nor were there differences in the 
frequency of severe violence or threats of violence.75  If such treatment is only 
 
domestic violence cases be screened out of restorative justice programs unless the program is 
carefully structured, see FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 26, 29, 30. 
 70. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 57. 
 71. Id. at 59-60. 
 72. Id. at 56. 
 73. Id. at 57; FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 11, 26, 27. 
 74. Stubbs, supra note 5 at 44. 
 75. Daly, supra note 25, at 68-69; Adele Harrell, The Impact of Court-Ordered Treatment 
for Domestic Violence Offenders, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH 
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, NCJ171666, at 73-74 (A.B.A. & U.S. Dep’t of Just. eds. 
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moderately effective, the argument goes, why should we embrace an approach 
to intimate violence that relies upon what is only a moderately effective 
intervention?  Sixth, to the extent apology might be important to restorative 
justice concepts, a debatable question,76 the use of apology in cases of 
domestic violence is often coercive rather than healing.77  An approach to 
intimate violence that facilitates or encourages apology as an element of 
restitution (in the colloquial, rather than legal sense of that term) may be 
ineffective or harmful at worst.  Seventh and finally, a restorative justice 
response to intimate violence against women violates the central tenet of 
liberal feminism that crimes of interpersonal violence against women receive 
the same treatment as crimes of interpersonal violence against men.78  That is, 
if incarceration and fines are the norm for male on male violence, then taking 
incarceration and fines off the table constitutes justice “lite” for female victims 
of male violence.79 
These concerns have merit and thus cannot and should not be ignored.  
However, a restorative justice response that is designed with feminist concepts 
in mind, and that responds to those concerns to the extent possible, is worth 
considering if early evaluations of its acceptability to participants, safety, and 
effectiveness in reducing repeat offending are reproducible.  The following 
section describes the preliminary evidence. 
V.  EVIDENCE THAT RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IS SUCCEEDING WHERE 
TRADITIONAL PRO-PROSECUTION APPROACHES HAVE NOT 
 
2000).  On the extent to which batterer’s programs are effective, see also R. EMERSON DOBASH 
ET AL., CHANGING VIOLENT MEN 69-88, 107-145 (2000). 
 76. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 11, at 15.  Researchers have studied the occurrence of 
apologies in community conferences and other restorative justice responses and have compared 
the outcomes of those cases with those where apology does not take place.  Whether or not 
apology in fact is an inherent component of a restorative justice response, however, is as yet 
undertheorized in the literature.  For one analysis on the impact of the apology in the criminal 
justice system, see Carrie Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for 
Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System, 20 BEHAV. SCI. L. 337 
(2002). 
 77. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 58-60.  Donna Coker describes this particular problem of 
overvaluing apologies in the context of battering.  See Coker, supra note 11, at 85-88.  The same 
argument can be made with respect to the often concurrently discussed phenomenon of 
forgiveness.  See, e.g., FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 39. 
 78. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
 79. If, however, violence between intimates causes a unique harm, it might thus warrant a 
particularized remedy that addresses that harm.  In this sense, then, restorative justice would not 
be treating similar crimes differently, but treating different crimes differently.  A victim-centered 
restorative justice response that yields reduced trauma to victims than traditional criminal justice, 
responds to victims’ express preferences, and fashions redress in accordance with those 
preferences could thus be consistent with liberal feminism. 
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Given the foregoing criticisms and concerns about applying restorative 
justice to adult-to-adult family violence, and particularly the concern that 
victimized women may be pressured into forgiving and reconciling with their 
violent partners, it is not surprising that researchers have shied away from 
testing those concerns.80  As a result, there is little empirical evidence either 
supporting or rebutting them.  In addition to Donna Coker’s study of Navajo 
Peacemaking discussed above, Joan Pennell and Gale Burford’s innovative 
work in Canada and Pennell’s continuing work in the United States provides a 
notable exception to this dearth of hard data on using restorative justice 
methods for adult domestic violence.81 
The discussion below focuses on Pennell and her colleagues’ work for a 
number of reasons.  First, Pennell and her colleagues’ work has not yet been 
discussed thoroughly in the legal literature.  Second and more substantively, 
Pennell’s empirical research provides data on non-indigenous as well as 
indigenous groups’ use of restorative justice that adds to, and complements, 
Coker’s earlier study that focused exclusively on restorative justice within an 
indigenous justice system.  Third, the programs Pennell and her colleagues 
describe, and thus their scholarship itself, benefit from the fact that the 
programs were designed as research-based programs from the outset.  Several 
inter-related benefits arise from this inter-linking of program development and 
research.  For instance, Pennell and her colleagues were able to establish 
comparison groups so that the effectiveness of their programs could (and can) 
be carefully measured and evaluated.  In addition, Pennell and her colleagues’ 
scholarship describes programs and program development from the outset of 
those programs onward thus providing us with a ground up view of the 
theoretical and practical undergirding of their programs followed by data on 
their implementation and effectiveness.  Finally, Pennell and her colleagues 
intentionally and methodically consulted with domestic violence advocates in 
the development of their research programs.  In so doing, they attempted to 
incorporate program-design elements that address some of the feminist 
 
 80. See Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Feminist Praxis: Making Family Group Conferencing 
Work, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 108-09 [hereinafter 
Feminist Praxis] (noting that feminists approach with caution new approaches to family violence 
that involve bringing perpetrators and victims together). 
 81. See generally id.  Notably, however, Pennell and Burford’s innovative use of restorative 
justice for cases of adult domestic violence came about inadvertently rather than by design.  The 
initial Canadian project aimed solely at cases of child abuse, neglect, and “youth 
unmanageability,” but adult domestic violence soon became an equal focus of research, as 
described below.  Id. at 110 (describing how the initial focus of the Family Group Decision 
Making Project was on child abuse, neglect, and delinquency, but that evidence of adult domestic 
violence quickly emerged as a prevalent co-occurring phenomenon in the families referred to the 
Project).  Coker’s work is discussed in Part IV, supra. 
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concerns about restorative justice that Coker and others so eloquently identify.  
Their work thus represents the next stage in the development of a feminist-
defined restorative justice response to violence against women. 
A. Canadian Family Group Decision Making Project 
In the early-1990s Pennell and Burford developed and implemented the 
Family Group Decision Making Project in Canada (“FGDMP” or the 
“Canadian Project”),82 a quasi-experimental program that employed the form 
of restorative justice known as family group conferencing (“FGC”) initially 
directed at cases of child abuse, neglect, and dependency.83  In the early stages 
of the Project, however, it quickly became apparent that adult domestic 
violence was a prevalent co-occurring event in the cases referred to the Project, 
occurring in twenty-one of the thirty-two families referred.84  Pennell and 
Burford embraced this development and incorporated into the FGDMP the 
adult family violence they uncovered.85  They ultimately concluded that failure 
to address the co-occurrence of child and spouse abuse shortchanged 
 
 82. Joan Pennell & Marie Weil, Initiating Conferencing: Community Practice Issues, in 
FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY-CENTERED CHILD AND 
FAMILY PRACTICE 253, 255-57 (Gale Burford & Joe Hudson eds., 2000) [hereinafter Initiating 
Conferencing] (noting the early 1990s as the beginnings of the Family Group Decision Making 
Project, and the dearth of empirical data on the effectiveness of conferencing at that point in 
time).  “The term ‘family group decision making’ was coined to emphasize that the family group, 
made up of the immediate family and its relatives, friends, and other close supports, would decide 
what steps needed to be taken to stop the maltreatment.”  Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Family 
Group Decision Making: Protection Children and Women, 79 CHILD WELFARE 131, 137 (2000) 
[hereinafter Family Group Decision Making]. 
 83. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 118. 
 84. Id. at 110; see also Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 148.  This finding 
mirrors others’ research into the co-occurrence of adult domestic violence and child abuse.  
Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 114 (citing Jeffrey Edleson, The Overlap Between Child 
Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999); PETER JAFFE, 
DAVID WOLFE, & SUSAN WILSON, CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN (1990); MURRAY STRAUS 
& RICHARD GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND 
ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES (1990); Susan Ross, Risk of Physical Abuse to 
Children of Spouse-Abusing Parents, 20 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 589 (1996)). 
 85. See Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 137 (“From the outset, child 
welfare services, women’s groups, police, parole officers, youth advocates, and others developed 
a consensual statement of philosophy that stressed that everyone within a family should be safe 
from abuse, no one in a family was safe if others were being victimized.”).  Pennell and Burford 
have elaborated on the importance of addressing child abuse and adult abuse jointly rather than as 
discrete phenomena in this same article.  Id. at 133-36. 
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families.86  Pennell and Burford’s holistic intervention yielded marked 
reductions in both child and spouse abuse.87 
The Canadian Project conducted family group conferences with thirty-two 
families over the course of a one year implementation period, coupled with a 
one to two-year follow-up period.88  The Project requested that the most 
difficult cases be referred to the FGDMP.89  Pennell and Burford also 
established a comparison group, consisting of another set of families who did 
not go through FGCs.90  The families were distributed roughly evenly between 
three different implementation locales.91 
Upon referral to the Canadian Project, family members engaged in 
extensive pre-conferencing work with conference coordinators, continuing 
over a period of weeks, to guarantee that all participants were prepared and 
that safety of participants was ensured.92  The conference consisted of three 
basic phases.  First, the coordinator and other professionals outlined the ground 
rules and the factual basis for referring the family to the Project in the first 
place.93  Second, professional outlines provided background material on the 
problems identified and social and therapeutic services available to address 
them.  Third, the family group was left alone to deliberate and develop a plan 
to address the identified problems.94  Fourth, the professionals reviewed the 
plan developed by the family to ensure that it addressed all issues of concern 
and, further, that it included adequate monitoring provisions.95  Once 
approved, the plan was then implemented.  Plans typically included expected 
components such as mental health and substance abuse services and material 
assistance from government agencies, but often also included plans for 
recreation and leisure events with family members.96  This latter component, 
when it was included, may have helped in promoting family unity, which 
 
 86. See id. at 134. 
 87. Id. at 143-51; see also infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text (discussing the project 
results). 
 88. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 138; Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, 
at 110. 
 89. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 110. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 138.  The three locales were Nain, 
Port au Port Peninsula, and St. John’s.  Id.  See also infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text 
(discussing the diversity of populations residing in these three locations). 
 92. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 139-40. 
 93. Id. at 140. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 141. 
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Pennell and Burford identified as important to the reduction of family 
violence.97 
The results of the Canadian Project were encouraging and provide some 
evidence of an intervention program that is effective in reducing family 
violence.  The results of the Project also provided welcome answers to some of 
the concerns posed by feminists and victim advocates about the application of 
restorative justice to family violence.  First, the concern that batterers would 
use the conference as an opportunity to further abuse their partners was not 
borne out: in none of the conferences was any violence reported.98  This is 
particularly striking given that the families were left alone to work on the 
issues presented without the oversight of service providers or the conference 
coordinator.99 
Second, and more importantly, significant actual reductions in post-
conference partner and child abuse were demonstrated.100  These reductions in 
family violence were in direct contrast with the comparison group, in which 
increased incidents of violence during the study period were noted.101  The 
families referred for FGC presented more incidents of violence (233 events) 
prior to entering the Canadian Project than did the comparison families (129 
events).102  By the conclusion of the Canadian Project, violent events within 
the study families were not eliminated, but were cut almost in half (117 
events);103 by contrast, violent events in the comparison group families rose 
(165 events).104  This finding provides important evidence of the effectiveness 
of restorative justice in reducing the prevalence of family violence. 
Third, the study measured some of the controlling behaviors by batterers 
that feminist advocates are concerned would not be accounted for, much less 
reduced by restorative justice methods, and found marked reductions in all 
behaviors studied.105  For instance, the study measured family functioning 
including offender’s domination of conversation, resistance to her meeting 
with program personnel without his being present, and control of economic 
resources.  In each of these categories, interviews with the participants in the 
study group revealed significant improvement: during the average one-year 
follow up period, domination of the conversation reduced from four to two 
incidents pre- versus post-conferencing, and control of economic resources 
 
 97. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, 144-45. 
 98. Id. at 140. 
 99. Id. at 140. 
 100. Id. at 145-50. 
 101. Id. at 145-47. 
 102. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 145-47. 
 103. Id. at 145. 
 104. Id. at 147. 
 105. Id. at 146, 149-50. 
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reduced from four to zero incidents.106  By contrast, the comparison group saw 
little to no improvement, and, in some instances, evidenced a worsening: 
control of discussion stayed constant at two incidents pre- and post-study, 
whereas control of economic resources increased from three to four incidents 
pre- versus post-study.107  Emotional abuse – unrecognized by traditional 
criminal justice response – saw similar reductions in the study families and 
increases in the comparison families.  Men in the study families belittled their 
partner (describing her as stupid, crazy, incompetent, and so on) in five 
incidents pre-study versus three times post-study and were otherwise overly 
solicitous and condescending to them in four incidents pre- versus two 
incidents post-study.108  The comparison group numbers again demonstrate the 
reverse trend: no incidents of belittling were indicated pre-study; whereas one 
incident was noted post-study period, and rates of condescension stayed level 
at three incidents throughout.109 The study also measured batterer’s 
minimization of his violence, transference of responsibility for the violence to 
the victim, and/or refusal to accept responsibility for it.  As with the prior non-
physical abuse measures, study families saw a reduction from eight to three 
incidents, pre- versus post-study, whereas the comparison group saw an 
increase from four to six incidents.110  Finally, feminist concerns that 
restorative justice would fail to account for, respond to, or change underlying 
patriarchal belief systems proved unfounded.  The Project tested for offenders’ 
“rigid” adherence to traditional sex roles, including “expecting or demanding 
that [his partner] serve him.”111  While these beliefs reduced from three to one 
in the study families pre- versus post-study, these sexist and gendered notions 
of male/female relationships remained constant at five in the control group.112  
All of these findings from the Canadian Project begin to give us some answers 
to feminist concerns about using restorative justice in response to gendered 
violence.  Those answers uniformly point to the benefits of such an approach 
and provide evidence that those concerns, while conceptually well-founded, 
are empirically not supported. 
B. Applicability of Family Group Conferencing with Culturally and 
Regionally Diverse Populations 
 
 106. Id. at 141-42, 146. 
 107. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 146. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  For a cogent presentation of the feminist concern that restorative justice would leave 
a batterer’s belief system intact, see FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 25-26. 
 112. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 146. 
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In addition to the foregoing concerns about applying restorative justice to 
gendered violence, at least one commentator has questioned whether 
restorative justice methods, originally the province of indigenous peoples, 
would ultimately prove feasible or effective in non-indigenous contexts.113  
Pennell and Burford’s Canadian study provides at least a preliminary answer to 
that question.  In the Canadian Family Group Decision Making Project, 
Pennell and Burford deployed the Project in three culturally and regionally 
diverse locales in the Canadian province of Newfoundland & Labrador: an 
Inuit community located on the coast of Labrador, a rural area consisting of a 
mix of British, French, and Micmac populations, and an urban setting, the 
capital of the province consisting primarily of residents of Irish and British 
derivation.114  Upon completion of the Canadian Project, Pennell joined forces 
with Marie Weil in developing a United States-based family group 
conferencing program, the North Carolina Family Group Conferencing Project 
(“NCFGCP”).  The NCFGCP sought to mainstream the Canadian Projects’ 
approach but again included diverse groups within its purview.115  Early 
analysis of the North Carolina program indicates that it yields similarly 
positive outcomes.116  The diversity of populations included in the Canadian 
and U.S. studies suggests that FGC can be used with good effect in various 
cultural and regional milieus.117 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion proposes that we listen to the voices of victims of 
domestic violence and that we honor those voices in true feminist fashion, by 
crafting responses to the violence they suffer that mirror the remedies victims 
request.  Further, the failure of three decades of legal reform to change 
prevalence rates in any significant way suggests that we need to explore 
alternative, even risky, approaches to the problem of intimate violence.  The 
preliminary evidence from restorative justice programs that address family 
violence demonstrate that it may be more effective than all of the heavier 
handed pro-incarceration efforts to which feminists in the United States have 
been directing their efforts. 
But what might we sacrifice if we focus on an individualized response 
tailored to the needs of particular victims?  We are faced with the question of 
 
 113. Coker, supra note 11, at 107-08. 
 114. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 138. 
 115. Initiating Conferencing, supra note 82, at 255-57; Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 
115. 
 116. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 115; Joan Pennell & Stephanie Francis, Safety 
Conferencing: Toward a Coordinated and Inclusive Response to Safeguard Women and Children, 
10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). 
 117. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 109. 
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whether the infliction and/or resultant harm of intimate assault is merely the 
expression and result of local rage of an individual towards a particular victim 
for a set of relationship-specific reasons, or whether it is group-based with 
some broader cause or effect.  We risk reverting to a focus on the relationship 
rather than the violence.  We miss the impact of intimate violence on women 
as a group, not just in terms of its disparate impact on women, but also how it 
more subtly serves to perpetuate patriarchal notions of men’s dominance over 
women.118  We risk losing the expressive function of law in combating 
domestic violence and thereby potentially neglect the transformative power of 
law to change social norms rather than individual behavior.  Thus, any 
restorative justice process must be sensitive to addressing the transformative 
power of a justice process on changing social norms and must create a process 
by which the sufferings of the individual are generalized to the treatment of 
women as a group.  In our own work on sexual assault, for example, we 
decided to issue quarterly press releases in which the functioning of the 
program, general types of cases received, and actions taken are communicated 
to the citizenry.  In addition, we aim to emphasize empowering the program’s 
community oversight board, not just to respond to individuals, but to take a 
lead in energizing the community’s social change agenda when they see certain 
patterns of rape that are re-occurring such as alcohol related rape.  We continue 
to seek out new and better ways to expand the transformative potential of 
RESTORE to alter prevailing social norms that undergird violence against 
women. 
 
 118. See generally E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under 
Title VII and the “Reasonable Heterosexist” Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56 
(1997).  The idea that battering one’s intimate partner is an act of sexism or a projection of 
discriminatory animus toward the larger group might seem, at first glance, to be in conflict with 
the traditional idea of intimate relationships, where there is a presumption of liking.  See Hopkins, 
Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 465.  In contrast to cases of racist violence, most 
batterers and victims of intimate assault, would not say the assault was committed because of the 
victim’s gender.  Id.  Putting aside whether batterers would acknowledge the gender motivation 
for their violence, domestic violence victims would find extremely odd the idea that, “he beat her 
because she was a woman.”  Id. at 466.  A punch is also gender (and race or sexual orientation) 
neutral.  Without the surrounding context, the violence cannot easily be seen as discriminatory 
and can more easily be understood as the product of a single bad agent acting out violently for 
localized, individual reasons.  Id.  The violence can be seen as a statement that the perpetrator is 
more dominant than the victim, both physically and socially: “I beat you because I am bigger than 
you (perhaps because I am male and you are female),” or “I beat you because I am allowed to 
beat you because it is my privilege as a man to beat my woman.”  Id.  As discussed above, many 
feminist advocates for victims put forward this combined sense of entitlement, rooted in 
patriarchal ideas. Violence is clearly oppressive.  Id. at 467.  In combination with a theory of 
entitlement that violence in an otherwise sexist world suggests, perhaps this may be sufficient for 
one to infer that it is gender discrimination, and thus more appropriate for expressive and 
symbolic civil justice rather than individualized response.  Id. 
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These are not small concerns, however, and not subject to an easy fix.  
They also are not as subject to empirical test as is effectiveness in individual 
cases, or even effectiveness in reducing overall prevalence rates.  On the other 
hand, to the extent that the harm at issue affects women as a group rather than 
individually, intimate violence differs from stranger assault, which requires 
that women be careful about where they walk, and when, and how, and with 
whom.  In this way, the sexual assault or rape of one woman serves to put all 
women in fear of a similar assault.119  This same systemic or political concern 
is not so clear in the case of intimate violence, but it is nonetheless present.  
Because of that, we need to move slowly and cautiously in applying new 
methods like restorative justice to intimate violence against women, despite its 
great promise.  We have to cautiously apply new methods and carefully 
evaluate them so that we are aware of the impacts of our work both positive 
and negative.  The scholarly debate cannot move much further forward without 
implementation and empirical evaluation to provide new evidence to move the 
dialogue forward.  Our research in the RESTORE program, where we are 
using restorative justice for a narrow class of sexual crimes, employs just such 
an incremental approach to developing empirical data to guide future 
theorizing and practice. 
 
 119. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 2-3 (1988). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] APPLYING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO ONGOING INTIMATE VIOLENCE 313 
 
 
